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Review of On the Origin of Stories: Evolution, Cognition, Fiction by Brian Boyd 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009.  Pp 540. $35.00 cloth)  


That the school of literary criticism increasingly if a little misleadingly known as Literary Darwinism defines itself in express opposition to the assumptions of “theory” might seem strange given that the heyday of theory-driven literary criticism is now well more than two decades past.  Yet inasmuch as the various forms of cultural studies and historicism that have succeeded the vogue of theory perpetuate its core ideas the head-on attacks by the Literary Darwinists may not be so of place after all.   If there is one working principle that is widely shared by the reigning approaches in the academy it is that, as they say, “everything is constructed,” and as this language betrays, the style of thinking epitomized by this slogan, the disposition to regard all categories of experience as “produced” by social forces conceived as discursive fields, has a particular history.  The term “constructed” directly descends, through deconstruction, from the concept of “structure” as it was employed in French structuralism of the 50s and 60s, which promoted systemic explanations of cultural works over “subjective” or humanistic ones.  This preference largely survives in literature departments today.  The credo “everything is constructed” signals a tone and an attitude, a determination to see literary works in broad social terms rather than as singular achievements of the human imagination.  Now it might seem that for anyone dissatisfied with such a regime the best way to counter it would be to apply a degree of attention to  a novel or poem that shows by example how much of what we respond to in literary art is left out by either theory or the totalizing approaches derived from it.  But the Literary Darwinists, braving the objection that they are countering one brand of theory with another, have rather sought to put the whole enterprise of academic criticism on a new footing.  So far, however, Literary Darwinism has remained a fringe movement, though gaining in visibility, and while part of that may be attributed to the distaste and even hostility aroused in the minds of literature professors by the idea that their field might profitably be wed to science, it is also true that the movement has not yet produced the galvanizing synthesis that would make a compelling case for the sweeping reorientation its practitioners call for.   
With The Origin of Stories: Literature, Cognition, and Evolution, Brian Boyd, a literary critic best known for his delightful two-volume biography of Nabokov, attempts to deliver that big synthesis.   For him the good news is that according to the latest understanding of mind furnished by science the premises of the cultural constructivist approach are simply fallacious.  “Biology Trumps Theory,” as the blurb advertising his article on the cover of The American Scholar baldly put it a few years back.  His purpose is thus to show how a more accurate, scientifically-informed conception of the role of play and art in individual and collective development will lead to a clarification of our interest in fiction and hence to a more responsive and rewarding criticism.  This is a tall order, and not only because it flies in the face of settled assumptions.  It also has to show how generalizations derived from empirical study of the mind might bear in specific ways on the fine points of literary performances.  Prima facie, it is possible to grant that evolutionary psychology has something to say about the broad motives behind our interest in literature; but then one has to wonder whether it can tell us anything about our interest in a specific text that would not apply equally well to many other texts.  As Joseph Carroll himself formulated the challenge: “[Literary Darwinism] will have achieved consilience and will have mastered its subject when it can integrate the sociobiological theory of inclusive fitness, the theory of proximal mechanisms from evolutionary psychology, and the most subtle insights of traditional interpretive criticism” (Literary Darwinism: Evolution, Human Nature, and Literature. New York:  Routledge, 2004, 84).  Yet one need not embrace the status quo to wonder about the benefit of translating “the most subtle insights of traditional interpretive criticism” into the objectivist language of science.   
Rhetorically, Boyd’s exposition falls into two parts: a lengthy, philosophical section in which his aim is to present nothing less than a naturalistic account of our interest in, and capacity for, fiction, situated within a global account of the evolution of the human mind; and then a second, “applied” section in which his task is to show how this fuller understanding of the nature of fiction can orient criticism towards more satisfying engagements with literary texts.  But before he can even get to the general discussion of the origins of fiction, he has to shoo away the various bogeymen that are apt to arise in the minds of humanists when it is a question of bringing science to bear on their domain.  The chief of these are racism and reductionism.  There are many reasons why a focus on cultural particularism has become paramount in today’s academic discourse, but certainly one of the main ones is the heightened sensitivity, since the 60s, to the chauvinism latent in standards of judgments decked out in the guise of universalism, as standards are wont to be, to say nothing of the racist legacy of early 20th-century anthropology and the eugenic policies of the Nazis.  Yet though the motives for treating individual cultures as irreducibly particular are understandable, that does not necessarily make them consistent with the widest and most rigorous search for truth, and Boyd contends that the elevation of culture as a terminal explanatory principle in the humanities at best tells only half the story.  Conceding that “a critique of unquestioned Western assumptions about human nature was needed…” he goes on to argue that “the best way to [accomplish such a critique] is not to deny that human nature exists, but to apply the hard tests of science, examining humans against other species; in many cultures, from hunter-gatherer bands to modern industrialized states; in many ages, in their history and their arts… to investigate human universals and human particulars, similarities and differences” (Italics in original, p. 23).  In other words, the critique of Western parochialism broached in the 60s by Barthes, Levi Strauss, Foucault, and others was itself parochial, in that, celebrating difference, it slighted sameness.  As Boyd maintains, a universalistic conception of human nature is not only a surer defense against racism anyway, since it affirms our shared biological endowment across cultures, but it also has the by no means negligible advantage of being true.  
As for the specter of reductionism, unfortunately Boyd’s exorcism is less convincing.  He claims that an appeal to nature as a source of explanation for human creations need not be reductive but expansive.  Yet the claim remains on the level of mere assertion, and, in fact, later in his exposition he gives a rather unsuccessful example, which I quote in full:  
Stephen Jay Gould reported feeling overwhelmed when he sang in a full performance of Berlioz’s Requiem.  Conceding that his reaction could conceivably be explained by neurobiology or sociobiology, he insisted that neither could ever capture “anything of importance about the meaning of that experience.”  An objective explanation necessarily differs from a subjective sensation, but surely it can only add to rather than subtract from the emotional  impact of the experience to view it in the light of the ecstatic carnival choruses of chimpanzees, frenziedly  hooting, drumming and running or swinging about together  -- or in the steady glow of our own need for shared attention, from the moment we are born, and the emotional charge nature has therefore built, on top of social sympathy in other mammals, into human shared attention.  
Well, no, actually.  The comparison of Gould’s participation in the choir to the swinging and hooting chimps is the very definition of what most people would call reductive.  I do not deny that there are times when viewing one’s own behavior in zoological terms may be a source of insight and even uplift, but the feeling of elevation Gould experienced, though it doubtless has neurological and biological components, does not seem to be one of them.   “The meaning of Gould’s experience,” what Boyd calls its emotional impact, in all its width and depth, just is what he immediately apprehends it to be in the moment.  To seek to explain it in terms which, however true, are not, as it were, phenomenologically active in the psyche of the one undergoing the experience, is like mentioning to somebody in love that increased levels of oxytocin released in the blood of the prairie vole during sexual arousal promotes subsequent pair-bonding.   Boyd is blithely confident that an objective explanation enhances subjective experience, but the objective view of subjective sentiment is a good working definition of irony, which is always to some degree deflating.  Moreover, it appears that Boyd, at least on some level, implicitly understands this and even intends the irony of his example.  Seemingly plucked out of the blue, it is in fact loaded.  Gould was a staunch opponent of evolutionary psychology, at least in its earlier incarnation as sociobiology, and an intemperate one at that, if the accounts of the evolutionary psychologists are to be believed.  He was also the one who advanced the rather dubious thesis that the discoveries of science should not be seen as a threat to religion’s credibility because the two realms are “non-overlapping magisteria.”  Thus to choose Gould singing in the performance of a religious work as an example of an experience that is enhanced by a biological explanation is a kind of inside joke, but the joke works only because the juxtaposition of Gould’s account of his experience and the appeal to a wider, objective explanation is ironic.  There are times when “explanation” of subjective experience is simply impertinent, in both senses.       
In any case, while he is obliged to register his awareness of the ways in which his position goes against the grain of the reigning orthodoxy, close, mano a mano combat with theorists is not Boyd’s intention.  Stephen Pinker, whose arguments on this score and several others Boyd follows closely, offers a much more sustained and combative refutation of the idea that everything is culturally constructed in his powerful book, The Blank Slate (2003).  But then Pinker in the same book provocatively compares art to “cognitive cheesecake,” suggesting that art delivers highly intensified stimuli to our congenital hunger for information far beyond what would be in keeping with any real need of the organism.  To be compared to something as superfluous as cheesecake is certainly a blow to the dignity of art, if the idea of art one has in mind is, say, Proust.   But that doesn’t mean that Pinker’s analogy isn’t just.   Indeed, it is easier to agree with Pinker if one switches one’s idea of literary art from a lofty instance like Proust to something like genre fiction or television shows, the staple forms of literary art that most people now consume.  From a planetary-zoological view, such consumption might well seem to be a gratuitous means of diversion, hit upon by a race of too successful mammals, that merely play upon their inborn appetite for social intrigue and sensational discovery.  Pointing out that the cheesecake analogy is skewed towards consumption, Boyd argues that it is rather in the creation of art that we should seek its significance.  Since art is produced in every human culture ever identified, he contends, it is highly unlikely that such a ubiquitous activity would not serve an adaptive end.   In other words, art is essential rather than epiphenomenal.  
After reviewing a number of other competing hypotheses about the nature of art (art is not a meaningful category, art is useless, art is a form of sexual display, etc.), Boyd comes to his own proposal that we view art “as a kind of cognitive play, the set of activities designed to engage human attention through their appeal to our preference for inferentially rich and therefore patterned information” (85).   This is very broad, as it must be if it going to describe the nature of art in a manner as remote from our ordinary point of view as an evolutionary perspective requires.   Play is a kind of behavior in which we act upon imaginary premises that imitate real-life scenarios; in Kantian terms, such behavior has the form of purposiveness without purpose.  In his introduction Boyd cites the examples of dolphins sporting with their bubbles, or young apes mocking their elders by mimicking their aggressive displays.  It has become common to see in the play behavior of animals, including that of human babies, a rehearsal of the skills and emotions that will later come in handy in “real” situations, but as the elementary case of the dolphins makes clear, play also involves a kind of sheer delight in the exercise of one’s capacities.  As for the term cognitive, it has gained currency in recent decades as a way of meeting the need, after a century dominated by the Freudian view of psychic life as a conflict among primordial instinctual forces, for a term that refers to the domain of mental life comprised by how we habitually think about objects in the world, how we process information.  Accordingly, the conception of art as cognitive play gives primacy to the perception of pattern in the organization of information, instead of, say, the passionate core of subjective truth that a more Romantic conception of art as expression would highlight.  In this regard, however, Boyd’s scientifically-informed perspective is congruent with one of the deepest reflexes of the postmodern Weltanschauung he shuns: for what is the implication of the nakedly baroque organization of much contemporary art other than that mind had an irresistible tendency to construct order out of the welter of the world?   
	To the above definition of art, Boyd immediately appends two functions: training the mind to be flexible and fostering creativity, or, as he more strikingly puts it: “nature has evolved art to create creativity” (119).  Elsewhere he offers another list with four functions, adding “raising the status of the author” and “increasing cooperation” to the two already mentioned.  (A profusion of different thesis-level formulations is in fact a rhetorical problem with this book, especially in the long first part, when too many key declarations resemble too many others, so that the edge of any one of them is blunted by the competition for attention from all the rest.  Though Boyd is a generally supple writer, the cumulative effect is like that of the pragmatist redescriptions of value in John Dewey, which quickly become bland and unreadable).  After the initial surprise of a formulation like “nature has evolved art to create creativity,” one also has to wonder whether Boyd has really tendered anything less pedestrian than the commonplace that art broadens the imagination.  Nor, again, are Boyd’s definition of art and his specifications of its functions incompatible with the current academic outlook he is trying to displace.  In principle, a constructivist or historicist could grant that art is play with pattern, for the purposes of training the mind and developing creativity, individual and collective, and strengthening cooperation, etc., and still carry on as before in good conscience, simply maintaining that Boyd’s descriptions of art take place on an altogether different plane of generality from the one that interests the critic.  A constructivist could even grant that Boyd has accurately described art’s function in global, anthropological terms, and then contend that precisely because the features he calls attention to are ubiquitous they are also uninteresting.  The biocultural critic looks at art through binoculars, the argument would go, while the constructivist looks at it through a microscope.   But, of course, Boyd means for his broad discussion of the nature of art to have a prescriptive force.  His emphasis on fundamental capacities we all share as members of a species, on the constitutive biases our conceptual apparatus has acquired through millions of years of evolutionary honing, prepares one to see art in terms of the dynamics of communication between artist and audience.  His quarrel with the constructivist mindset is that it misses the real action that occurs in the mind of somebody making or enjoying art.    
	From art in general Boyd builds, in good evolutionary fashion, up to the more specialized case of fiction, which he derives from more basic dispositions such as the mind’s proclivity to couch its understanding of events in narrative terms.  The culmination of this discussion, and of the first part of the book, comes in the chapter, “Fiction as Adaptation,” when he hypothesizes that the two chief functions of fiction are: “to [improve] the mind’s capacity to interpret events and to [increase] the range of our vicarious experience and behavioral options.”   These correspond to the two functions of art mentioned above, except that the focus on fiction now allows for greater specificity: “training the mind” becomes “improving the mind’s capacity to interpret” and “engendering creativity” becomes “increasing the range of our… behavioral options.”  The two benefits are distinct, but they effectively merge in the following statement, one of the better summations given along the way:  
Because fiction extends our imaginative reach, we are not confined to our here and now or dominated by automatic responses.  We can think in terms of hidden causes, of inspiring or admonitory examples from the past, fictional or real, of utopian and dystopian models, of probable scenarios or consequences, or of counterfactuals whose very absurdity clarifies our thought.  We know that there are always other spaces of the possible we can explore.  And much of the indefinite enormity of possibility space has been made concrete and particular through the examples of story…. This may be the most important function of pure fiction.  By appealing to our fascination with agents and actions, fiction trains us to reflect freely beyond the immediate and to revolve things in our minds within a vast and vividly populated world of the possible.  
We might call this the model model: fiction extends the range of our action by furnishing us with models that allow us to envision alternatives, explore options, visualize possible outcomes.  It is a big, encompassing hypothesis, and the nicely mixed compilation “hidden causes, of inspiring or admonitory examples from the past, fictional or real, of utopian and dystopian models, of probable scenarios or consequences, or of counterfactuals whose very absurdity clarifies our thought” provides enough to assure us that he is not thinking merely of anything as trite as moral exemplars, although for the sake of completeness that is in there, too (“inspiring or admonitory examples”).  
Despite the advertised novelty of his approach, Boyd’s definitions are really not that far from what we would expect ordinary intuition to come up with.  This is partly a function of their broadness and a warrant of their plausibility: an account of fiction’s benefits that did not gibe with the introspection of its beneficiaries would be suspect.  But his argument takes on bite mainly when contrasted with the assumptions that underlie the currently fashionable modes of academic criticism, which, with its disdain for “the subject” inherited from structuralism and post-structuralism, tend to attribute agency to language or culture without any realistic account of how texts appeal to and are received by individual minds.  This challenge to contemporary habits of thought is the ever-present subtext of Boyd’s exposition.  Yet even when it comes to the fore, as in the following passage, he takes pains to keep the emphasis mostly on the alternative.   
Stories employ words and conventions, but long before most narrative conventions emerged, we evolved a capacity not only for reexperiencing the past in memory but also for flexibly reconfiguring it to offer concrete simulations of future situations.  And when we engage with stories, our response does not restrict itself to the medium of presentation or to a kind of inner verbal retranscription.  Rather we create on the fly a mental world that we keep track of by experiencing it through semisimulation.  (157)
It is not language that shapes the mind or “creates reality,” as the least defensible of the mottoes from the poststructuralist heyday had it, but the other way around: “Language can report events so well because our overwhelming interest in human actions has itself shaped language” (174).  Thus, when we have cleared away these shibboleths, we can register more accurately the ways fiction moves us.  Ultimately, what is at stake are two divergent worldviews: a critical perspective that ascribes agency to language or culture conceived as a text is apt to ignore the individual or treat him as a creature of the system, however conceived, whereas one that highlights basic cognitive capacities will be dedicated to showing how it expands us, enriches our awareness and sympathies.
	But it would seem that Boyd, like the Literary Darwinist movement in general, overcorrects.  His biocultural approach seems too much in thrall to a strict empiricism and would have been enriched a good deal by a deeper mining of the humanist tradition.  As regards fiction’s providing us with models with which to think through complex scenarios in our lives, here, for instance, is Martha Nussbaum, writing about the importance of Henry James’s late novels as examples of moral scenarios imagined in all their irreducible particularity: 
If this view of morality is taken seriously and if we wish to have texts that represent it at its best (in order to anticipate or supplement experience or to assess this norm against others), it seems difficult not to conclude that we will need to turn to texts no less elaborate, no less linguistically fine-tuned, concrete and intricately focused, no less metaphorically resourceful, than [The Golden Bowl].  (Love’s Knowledge 157)  
And as for our being surrounding by “possibility space,” here is Sartre, writing in the more dramatic language of existential phenomenology:  “we may therefore conclude that imagination is not an empirical power added to consciousness, but it is the whole of consciousness as it realizes its freedom.”   For all its difference of intellectual milieu and style, the gist of this statement is not that different from Boyd’s claim that “because fiction extends our imaginative reach, we are not confined to our here and now or dominated by automatic responses” (The Imagination).   Both statements reflect the understanding of the imagination as the essential power that keeps us from being confined in a brute and reactive present -- but Boyd’s formulation goes out on an empirical limb, claiming that fiction actually serves the biological purpose of fostering the development of imagination in us.   By contrast, Sartre’s formulation, for all of its rhetorical flair, is both less vulnerable and more profound, and it was arrived at nothing more, or less, than analytic introspection.   Another example, already hinted at above, is the way in which Boyd’s general definition of art as a form of cognitive play resonates with Kant’s analysis of aesthetic judgment as involving the play of the faculties of cognition.  Indeed, despite the vast difference of intellectual milieu – Boyd is considering art from an anthropological perspective, Kant was concerned with the logical status of what he called aesthetic judgments and expressly rules out “mere” empirical and anthropological data from the purified zone of his philosophy –Boyd could have thrown his argument into sharper relief by comparing his literary Darwinist position with that of Kant and the later German Romantics, notably Schiller, who made play the defining capacity of the human.  It would have helped his cause had he cast himself less as a maverick literature professor advancing, with strange assurance, an original scientific hypothesis about the nature of art, and more as an impartial intellectual historian showing how recent thinking in science accords with some of the major insights into the nature of art bequeathed us by the literary and philosophical tradition.  
	When Boyd gets down to cases, the strength of his readings is such that one can feel he has succeeded quite well in making a “biocultural” perspective germane to the understanding of literature.  His first test case is none other than The Odyssey, which he begins by considering from the standpoint of the “strategies of attention” Homer employs in his poem.   In Boyd’s method, plot and character themselves become “strategies of attention,” in that they serve as ways for the poet to organize and concentrate information.  Beyond these, there are also the “ironies of structure,” the “open-ended patterns, internal structures that lack the popout effect of character and event” but that “can shimmer with implications that invite us back again and again…” (233).  Taking up each of these two classes of “strategies of attention” in turn, he builds an intricate conspectus of the many interrelationships that resonate with one another in Homer’s poem and make it into “highly charged social information” that will matter to his audience.   In effect what Boyd does is to redescribe the traditional formalist concept of unity in functional terms as a strategy for holding the audience’s attention.   He remarks that “unity of action,” which for Aristotle is the quality that sets Homer apart from other more clumsily episodic epic poets, “matters because it focuses our attention and promise an overall pattern into which every event fits like a voussoir into an arch” (224).  
As a reader, Boyd is especially good at articulating the satisfaction we take in moments of recognition, a satisfaction so deep that it can oddly retain its power even upon rereading, when we are fully aware of the course of events: 
Our pleasure in anticipating Odysseus’ homecoming is magnified by our consciousness that the mortal characters in the story often view his return as no more than a hollow hope, forever excluded by the presumed ‘fact’ of his death.  We anticipate his return, we enjoy the privilege of knowing that the gods have already initiated the process, and we look forward to the surprised pleasure of those who currently conjure up his return as no more than an impossible dream.  At the same time, since we do not know in detail what will happen, we remain curious (how can he possibly deal with all these suitors?), with a tinge of misgiving spicing our confidence…. Homer’s strategy here also appeals upon our return to the story….  We can relive the pleasure of our first encounter, recalling that we already knew more than any of the mortal characters, since we were already privy to Athene’s and Zeus’s acting in support of Odysseus.  Yet now we can also enjoy the pleasure of enjoying more than our already privileged earlier selves, since we now know exactly how much each of the long series of predictions or dismissed dreams of Odysseus’ return is true or false.  
This seems to me a lucid tally of the various pleasures of discovery associated with narrative: it is not only what is discovered, but how it is discovered, that is, how the eventual discovery is parceled out in stages so that even afterwards we can delight in retracing the gradually falling away of our ignorance as we rehearse the approach to the decisive moment when we were suddenly in the know.   Although it is not his express intention, Boyd’s reading is illuminating because it succeeds in capturing the double consciousness we sustain when we participate in the story and at the same time admire the author’s orchestration of the story to induce our participation. 
	But then the acuity of Boyd’s reading is double-edged: while one may feel that his articulation of how we respond to a well-told is bracing, it remains peskily unclear whether anything is really gained by his couching his insights in an analytical language informed by what he calls a “biocultural” perspective.   He makes much of the fact that literary critics often narrowly focus on the meaning of work, losing sight of the larger matter of how it functions, that is, how it affects readers.  Yet even this is overstated:  any good critic focuses on the ways in which the author achieves his effects, the ways he moves the reader towards participating in his world.  An awareness of how literary works affect us as opposed to what they mean is not a new contribution of Literary Darwinism.  Moreover, there seems to be something nearly tautological about “strategies of attention” as a critical rubric.  One could say that whatever was intriguing about this or that literary work, be it the depth of its psychology, the beauty of its language, the exoticism of its subject matter, the rigor with which it pursues its obsessions, its unity or, in some contemporary cases, its flagrant disunity, could be deemed “a strategy of attention.”  
Next to the above passages on the play of concealment and revelation in The Odyssey, one can juxtapose another fine passage from Boyd’s own oeuvre from his autobiography of Nabokov under the rubric of “the ironies of time”:
All the ironies of time in part 1 of the novel lead toward this surprise in the Enchanted Hunters Hotel.  All the ironies of time in part 2 arise from the fact that Humbert does not realize until almost the end of the book that the person who took Lolita from him was Clare Quilty, the man who wrote the play, The Enchanted Hunters, that is staged at Lolita’s school.  In part 1 we know from the first… that Humbert and Lolita must have become lovers, and even though we do not know how this will happen, we measure each inch of Humbert’s hesitant progress toward her against our knowledge of the fact that he eventually enjoys her as a lover.  Even before the start of part 2, we know that Humbert is a murderer, but we do not know whom he has murdered.
The procedure here is much the same as in the above passage that takes stock of the temporal ironies in The Odyssey: there is the same aligning of parallel trajectories, the better to throw into relief their subtle contrasts, the same cogent summation of the various contrasts between different arcs of expectation the audience (or reader) experiences in the course of its progress through the work.   But the commentary on Lolita was written almost two decades ago, and is altogether successful without a boost from what Boyd towards the end of his book dubs “evocriticism.” 
	In the midst of his discussion of The Odyssey, Boyd offers the following disclaimer to address to this issue: “I make no claim to have discovered all the patterns and ironies I marshal here, nor do I claim that they can be discovered only by adopting an evolutionary viewpoint.”  Then what is the advantage of the approach he is advocating?  His answer is “an evolutionary appreciation of social behavior nevertheless helps us to highlight authors and audiences as strategists….”  But this does not seem to be a unique benefit of adopting a biocultural approach either; a sense of the writer as strategist is what any good graduate student instructor of English 101 will try to impart to her freshmen.  As Boyd then goes on to spell out the particular kind of strategizing he has in mind, his argument is no more winning: “An evolutionary perspective helps us see The Odyssey’s subtler ironic patterns as a concerted suite of solutions to problems of maximizing audience attention in the particular situation Homer faced, at his place in the oral traditions, and with the Iliad already acclaimed, and given his own talents, inclinations, and ambitions.”   As a program for criticism, this is well and good -- it contains multitudes: adequately to understand Homer’s “ironic patterns,” and by extension any salient feature of his poem, we would want to take into account the universals of human psychology, the particular historical situation, the literary tradition, and relevant information from the author’s biography, if any is available.  An ample reading of a literary work would take in all of this, but ideally, apart from the question of whether this is what Boyd has done in this present book, we would also expect the ideal critic to assign appropriate weight to each of these factors of his “explanation” of the work.  There is no reason to assume that each of them contributes equally.  It could be the case – and much valuable contemporary criticism has decided it is – that “the particular situation [the writer] faced,” in other words the historical context, is more important, or at any rate that it offers more opportunities for novel scholarship, than the other variables.   Certainly classical studies, after two millennia of cumulative familiarity with its major works, tend to be historicist almost as a matter of necessity.   	
This ideal of a multidimensional comprehension of the literary work becomes even more explicit, even to the point of usurping the primacy of Boyd’s biocultural approach, at the beginning of the section on Dr. Seuss when he proposes “four interconnected levels of explanation appropriate to [Horton Hears a Who] or any other work of literature”:  the universal (the emotions and dispositions we all share), the local (the historical context), the individual (the personality of the artist), the particular (the formal devices the artist employs).  In his analysis, Boyd particularly wants to stress the life history of the author, in opposition to yet another of recent criticism’s dubious tendencies: the denial of genius.  “Genius exists,” Boyd maintains, although “we can no longer accept supernatural explanations for exceptional creativity.”  Instead, we should “[attempt] to explain it naturalistically” (351).  Inasmuch as genius is something to be explained, this is surely true.  Yet achieving this would require something close to the 1000+ pages of his biography of Nabokov to help us understand its subject, and not the ad hoc snippets of Dr. Seuss’s life story we get here, each just enough to support the next claim, in a jumble of theoretical claim, textual analysis, and spots of biographical and historical information.   There is information about Dr. Seuss’s longstanding fascination with elephants, his play with scale, his looseness of line, his (expressed) intentions in writing Horton Hears a Who, but it comes to the reader piecemeal, with all sorts of digressions to score theoretical points and brandish scientific evidence for our tendency to do this and that.  But the story is lost in the stir.     
	There is one reading of Seuss’s story that Boyd takes pains to reject: the political allegory sketched by historian Richard Minear in his book Dr. Seuss Goes to War, about Seuss’s wartime editorial cartoons, according to which Horton the Elephant, defending Who-Ville from the other jungle animals, represents the United States nurturing vulnerable postwar democratic Japan.  Boyd reports that Seuss himself gave life to this interpretation when he remarked that he conceived of the story after visiting postwar Japan and wanted to make a statement about the importance of voting.  Yet Boyd contends that the allegory quickly breaks down: if Horton is the U.S and Who-Ville Japan, he asks, then which country does the Kangaroo represent, which the Wickersham clan (the apes in the story)?  His bigger point is that this is the sort of abstract interpretation academics devise with little regard for the particulars of the author’s constitution and situation, although in this case he acknowledges that the academics in question have at least started with the author’s own admission.  “A political allegory would be a strange key to a children’s story,” he comments (323).  But part from the fact that, as works like The Wizard of Oz make clear, a story can function simultaneously as entertainment for children and as a political allegory, Boyd’s choice of example of the sort of academic interpretation he decries is quite infelicitous.  Boyd takes Minear to task for criticizing Seuss for the latter’s “’willful amnesia’ about the devastation of Japan… during World War II” and concludes that Minear’s reading is “too narrow and too blunt” (335).  Yet if, as Seuss himself disclosed, he was thinking of Who-Ville as Japan it does not seem unreasonable to think of Horton in his role as a gentle giant as the United States – this is not an abstract academic assignation of meaning but a receptivity to the emotional investments one feels in the story; and if Horton is a sentimentalized version of the United States, then there is an uncomfortable contradiction in the fact that he is desperate to protect the dust-speck that contains Who-Ville from being “boiled alive,” when that would not be an inaccurate description of what the atomic bomb did to the populations of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  So Minear’s charge of “willful amnesia” may be apt:  casting the destroyer in the role of the protector, attributing the worst of the destructive impulses to others, Seuss, whose anti-Japanese editorial cartoons pedaled all of the caricatures we have come to regard as demonizing and racist, seems to be engaged in a sentimental and confused gesture of self-vindication.  A couple of larger points emerge from this hermeneutic byway.   For one thing, as the careless choice of example makes clear, Boyd is merely cloaking his dismissal of an interpretation that doesn’t suit his tastes in the armature of his biocultural apparatus; and so, once again, one has the sense that the real labor of interpretation is not being guided by the approach whose efficacy Boyd has written this book to demonstrate.  Then, too, and more importantly, Boyd’s emphasis on authorial designs favors a sunny, rationalistic view of authorial agency, one in which the author is securely in control of all his effects, when arguably many great works of literature, from “Hamlet” to The Wings of the Dove, from Absalom! Absalom! to Infinite Jest, owe a good deal of their power to unresolved, subconscious conflicts in the mind of the writer.  
Towards the end of the book Boyd mentions that he had originally intended to discuss several other works, including Ulysses and Art Spiegelman’s graphic novel, Maus.  It is particularly regrettable that he did not get to Ulysses, because treating that novel from a biocultural standpoint would have required him to address an issue that is bound to nag his cause.  For however fruitful interpreting the great explosion of Ulysses as an assemblage of attention-getting strategies might have been, Boyd would have had to contend with the unhappy fact that outside of sundry college classrooms almost nobody reads Ulysses these days, if indeed many people ever did.  It would then seem that he would have to make some argument along the lines that the Joyce’s opus would hold the attention of more readers if they were properly equipped to appreciate its riches, that it is, in short, worthy of attention.  But if being worthy of attention and getting attention are different matters, then one arrives at the judgment that something is worthy of attention by criteria other than by the accident of popularity.   Boyd never addresses the question of what these criteria might be.  Why, if art works can be viewed as a set of strategies for capturing human attention are not the most spell-binding thrillers the highest form of art?  Certainly they command more attention than serious literature.  Boyd’s choices, a foundational text of Western culture, and a children’s book with wide appeal, make the relationship between merit and popularity appear self-evident, although one has to wonder whether were it not for the continuous intervention of a learned caste whether The Odyssey would have any more readership at present than Ulysses.  Obviously, Boyd had to deal with the constraints of space, but the choice of Horton, for all that it is a playful, amusing story, does little to allay the suspicion that a biocultural approach will tend to fall in line with conservative aesthetic tastes.  
	One topic it is a bit surprising that Boyd does not address is the good old quest for truth, which still seems to be one of the urgent reasons why some people are possessed to write fiction and others to devour it.  Perhaps his own aspiration to originality steered him away from this issue, which would have mired his discussion in all the vexed questions that surround the topic of mimesis.  In any case, one of Boyd’s stated objectives is to demonstrate the range of critical perspectives that a biocultural approach to fiction opens up, and at this he succeeds, showing the relevance of such topics as intelligence, deception, and false belief to literary studies.   Yet the book is not the tour-de-force one feels its author wants it to be.  The weakness of the project is that despite the vistas afforded by Boyd’s readings, he has in the end not sufficiently countered the reader’s sense that “evocriticism” is a reductive rather than expansive undertaking after all.  Boyd asserts the contrary, but his readings don’t really demonstrate it; when they are couched in scientific language they come to us stripped of the resonance, emotive and cultural, that make them our concern in the first place.  Obviously, scientific explanation does well to meld ultimate and proximate causes; but it is not clear that literary works benefit from being viewed from so detached a perspective.  It may be that proximate causes, because they are the ones that motivate us, are the ones that count for criticism.  Evolutionary psychology is bound to alter how we understand ourselves, and that altered understanding will affect the way we see all our activities, literature included, but it seems the direct attempt to see literature in the light of cognitive psychology and evolutionary psychology will always have something forced and awkward about it.  As Willaims Deresiewicz, reviewing Boyd’s book in The Nation phrased it: “the purpose of criticism is to understand the experience of art in experiential terms – in human terms…”  The deeper problem, which Boyd seem not to have considered, is not with the handful of approaches that currently define literary studies but with the notion that the critic needs to be armed with an approach at all -- that having an approach is necessary to legitimate one’s critical insights.  The best readings either lack a defined method, or, as On The Origin of Stories itself makes clear, if they arise under the auspices of one, nevertheless transcend it.   
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